708 C
HAPTER 23
NLRB v. JONES AND LAUGHLIN
STEEL CORP. (1937)
ORIGINS OF THE CASE
In 1936, the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation was charged
with intimidating union organizers and firing several union members. The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found the company guilty of “unfair labor practices” and
ordered it to rehire the workers with back pay.
THE RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress had the power to regulate labor rela-
tions and confirmed the authority of the NLRB.
LEGAL REASONING
In the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act, Congress claimed
that its authority to regulate labor relations came from the commerce clause
of the Constitution. Jones and Laughlin Steel argued that its manufacturing
business did not involve interstate commerce—it operated a plant and hired
people locally.
The Court disagreed. Although production itself may occur within one
state, it said, production is a part of the interstate “flow of commerce.” If
labor unrest at a steel mill would create “burdens and obstructions” to inter-
state commerce, then Congress has the power to prevent
labor unrest at the steel mill.
The Court also explained that the act went “no further
than to safeguard the right of employees to self-organization
and to select representatives . . . for collective bargaining.”
Departing from earlier decisions, the Court affirmed that
these are “fundamental” rights.
Long ago we . . . said . . . that a single employee
was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was
dependent . . . on his daily wage for the maintenance of
himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay
him the wages that he thought fair,
he was . . . unable to leave the
employ and resist arbitrary and
unfair treatment; that union was
essential to give laborers opportu-
nity to deal on an equality with
their employer.
’’
As a result, the Wagner Act
was allowed to stand.
Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes
SCHECHTER POULTRY CORP. v.
UNITED STATES (1935)
The Court struck down the National Industrial
Recovery Act, a key piece of New Deal legislation.
RELATED CASES
U.S. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 8
(C
OMMERCE CLAUSE)
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations and among the sever-
al States.”
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (1935)
“The term ‘affecting commerce’ means . . . tending to
lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing com-
merce or the free flow of commerce.”
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . .
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights [to organize unions].”
LEGISLATION
LEGAL SOURCES
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WHY IT MATTERED
The 1935 Wagner Act was one of the most important
pieces of New Deal legislation. Conservative justices
on the Supreme Court, however, thought New Deal
legislation increased the power of the federal govern-
ment beyond what the Constitution allowed. By the
time the Jones and Laughlin case reached the Court in
1937, the Court had already struck down numerous
New Deal laws. It appeared to many as if the Wagner
Act was doomed.
In February 1937, Roosevelt announced a plan to
appoint enough justices to build a Court majority in
favor of the New Deal. Critics immediately accused
Roosevelt of trying to pack the Supreme Court, thus
crippling the Constitution’s system of checks and bal-
ances.
Two months later, the Court delivered its opinion
in Jones and Laughlin and at about the same time
upheld other New Deal legislation as well. Most histo-
rians agree that the Court’s switch was not a response
to Roosevelt’s “Court-packing” plan, which already
seemed destined for failure. Nevertheless, the decision
resolved a potential crisis.
HISTORICAL IMPACT
The protection that labor unions gained by the
Wagner Act helped them to grow quickly. Union mem-
bership among non-farm workers grew from around
12 percent in 1930 to around 31 percent by 1950. This
increase helped improve the economic standing of
many working-class Americans in the years following
World War II.
Most significantly, Jones and Laughlin greatly broad-
ened Congress’s power. Previously, neither the federal
nor the state governments were thought to have suffi-
cient power to control the large corporations and hold-
ing companies doing business in many states. Now, far
beyond the power to regulate interstate commerce,
Congress had the power to regulate anything “essential
or appropriate” to that function. For example, federal
laws barring discrimination in hotels and restaurants
rest on the Court’s allowing Congress to decide what is
an “essential or appropriate” subject of regulation.
More recently, the Court has placed tighter limits
on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
In United States v. Lopez (1995), the Court struck
down a law that banned people from having hand-
guns near a school. The Court said Congress was not
justified in basing this law on its power to regulate
interstate commerce.
The New Deal 709
Choosing to work despite
the strike, a storekeeper
at the Jones and Laughlin
Steel Corporation tries to
pass through picket lines.
THINKING CRITICALLY
THINKING CRITICALLY
CONNECT TO HISTORY
1. Developing Historical Perspective
Lawyers for Jones
and Laughlin said that the Wagner Act violated the Tenth
Amendment. Chief Justice Hughes said that since the act
fell within the scope of the commerce clause, the Tenth
Amendment did not apply. Read the Tenth Amendment
and then write a paragraph defending Hughes’s position.
SEE SKILLBUILDER HANDBOOK, PAGE R11.
CONNECT TO TODAY
2.
Visit the links for Historic Decisions of the Supreme Court
and read the opening sections of United States v. Lopez.
There, Chief Justice Rehnquist offers a summary of the
Court’s interpretation of the commerce clause over the
years. Summarize in your own words Rehnquist’s descrip-
tion of the current meaning of the commerce clause.
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