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AFGHANISTAN
Key Oversight Issues
Report to Congressional Addressees
February 2013
GAO-13-218SP
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Page i GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Letter 1
Background 2
Scope and Methodology of This Review 11
Agency Comments 13
Enclosures I Afghanistan’s Security Environment 17
Enclosure II Transition of Lead Security to Afghan Security Forces 19
Enclosure III Future Cost and Sustainability of Afghan Security Forces 21
Enclosure IV DOD Planning for the Drawdown of Equipment in
Afghanistan 23
Enclosure V Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence 25
Enclosure VI Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Funds to Support
Afghanistan 27
Enclosure VII Oversight and Streamlining of Development Assistance to
Afghanistan 29
Enclosure VIII Oversight of U.S. Contracts in Afghanistan 31
Enclosure IX Planning for the Future U.S. Presence in Afghanistan 33
Contents
Page ii GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Appendix I Key Facts about Afghanistan 35
Appendix II Ethnic Map of Afghanistan 36
Appendix III Major U.S. Transit Points into and out of Afghanistan 37
Appendix IV Documents that Constitute the Strategic Framework for U.S.
Efforts in Afghanistan 38
Appendix V U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan 42
Appendix VI Related GAO Products 45
Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 53
Tables
Table 1: U.S. Allotments to Support Afghan Reconstruction and
Relief by Category and Selected Accounts, Fiscal Years
2002-2013 8
Table 2: Major U.S.-Administered Programs or Accounts Used to
Fund Development Efforts in Afghanistan 30
Table 3: Descriptions of the Afghan, U.S., and NATO Documents
that Constitute the Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan 38
Page iii GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figures
Figure 1: Interactive Geopolitical Map of Afghanistan 3
Figure 2: Time Line of Selected Events and U.S. Troop Levels in
Afghanistan, 2001-2012 5
Figure 3: Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan 7
Figure 4: Breakout of U.S. Allotments to Support Afghan
Reconstruction and Relief, Fiscal Years 2002-2012 10
Figure 5: Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported by Type
in Afghanistan, December 2005 through December 2012 17
Figure 6: Number of Insider Attacks from 2007 through 2012 18
Figure 7: Projected U.S. and Other Donor Support for ANSF 22
Figure 8: Cost of Various Routes for the Removal of Containers and
Vehicles from Afghanistan 24
Figure 9: Afghanistan’s Domestic Revenues from 2006 to 2011 25
Figure 10: Afghanistan’s Total Public Expenditures from 2006 to
2011 26
Figure 11: U.S. Dollars and Afghan Afghanis 28
Figure 12: U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan 34
Figure 13: Key Facts about Afghanistan 35
Figure 14: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan 36
Figure 15: Major U.S. Transit Points into and out of Afghanistan 37
Abbreviations
AFSA Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
AIF Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund
ANA Afghan National Army
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
APPF Afghan Public Protection Force
ASFF Afghan Security Forces Fund
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
Page iv GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program
DA Development Assistance
DOD Department of Defense
DOD CN Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and
Counter-Drug Activities
DOJ Department of Justice
ERMA Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
ESF Economic Support Fund
FMF Foreign Military Financing
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHCS Global Health and Child Survival
IDA International Disaster Assistance
IMET International Military Education and Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
MNNA Major Non-NATO Ally
MRA Migration and Refugee Assistance
NADR Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and
Related Programs
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
OPLAN Operational Plan
PKO Voluntary Peacekeeping
PMP Performance Management Plan
PSC Private security contractor
RC Regional Command
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers
Europe
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction
State Department of State
TFBSO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
UN United Nations
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
February 11, 2013
Congressional Addressees:
The U.S. strategic goal for Afghanistan is to defeat and prevent the return
of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Since fiscal year 2002, U.S. costs reported
for U.S. military, U.S. diplomatic, and reconstruction and relief operations
in Afghanistan have been over $500 billion.
1
Given U.S. strategic goals
and the level of U.S. resources expected to support Afghanistan in the
future, we have identified a number of key issues for the 113th Congress
to consider in developing oversight agendas and determining the way
forward in Afghanistan. Significant oversight will be needed to help
ensure visibility over the cost and progress of these efforts. The
enclosures, based on existing GAO work, suggest specific areas for
oversight on the following topics:
• Afghanistan’s security environment. Afghanistan’s security situation
remains volatile in part due to an increase in insider attacks.
• Transition of lead security to Afghan security forces. The security
transition is under way, and international forces are shifting to an
advise-and-assist mission.
• Future cost and sustainability of Afghan security forces. A shortfall
currently exists in Afghan domestic revenue and international
commitments to cover the anticipated costs of Afghan security forces,
and despite past recommendations and a congressional mandate, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has not routinely provided long-term
cost estimates for sustaining those forces.
• DOD planning for the drawdown of equipment in Afghanistan. DOD
has applied some lessons learned from Iraq to its planning and has
1
We reviewed estimates developed by the Congressional Research Service and Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, as well as obligations data provided by
DOD and allotment data provided by the Departments of Justice and State. While
allotment data are available for U.S. reconstruction and relief efforts in Afghanistan,
specific funding figures of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan do not exist because
funding provided to DOD for military operations is generally appropriated by operation, not
country. Specifically, DOD received funding for Operation Enduring Freedom, which
includes Afghanistan.
Page 2 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
taken several steps to prepare for the drawdown in Afghanistan, but
has not fully considered the costs and benefits of returning excess
equipment.
• Afghanistan’s donor dependence. Afghanistan’s domestic revenues
do not cover its total public expenditures, over 90 percent of which are
covered by the United States and international partners. The
international community has pledged its continued support.
• Oversight and accountability of U.S. funds to support Afghanistan.
The United States continues to take steps to improve Afghanistan’s
financial management capacity, as well as the accountability of U.S.
direct assistance.
• Oversight and streamlining of development assistance to Afghanistan.
Oversight of U.S. programmatic funds has been enhanced, but U.S.
development efforts in Afghanistan could benefit from a shared
database.
• Oversight of U.S. contracts in Afghanistan. Contract management and
contractor vetting require continued attention.
• Planning for the future U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The military to
civilian-led transition in Iraq could offer lessons for similar efforts in
Afghanistan as the United States plans for five diplomatic sites and
the future U.S. military presence is under negotiations.
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is a mountainous, land-locked, and
economically poor country of over 30 million ethnically diverse people
located in central Asia. (See fig. 1 for an interactive geopolitical map of
Afghanistan.)
Background
Page GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figure 1: Interactive Geopolitical Map of Afghanistan
Interactive graphic
• Click to make view needed visible. In the “Print” dialog box, choose “current view,” then “OK.” Repeat for each view.
• A print version of this graphic is also available in appendices I, II and III.
Print instructions
Directions:
[Click ] on the buttons to view more information.
Kandahar
Jalalabad
Herat
Mazar-e
Sharif
Pakistan
India
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
China
Iran
India
Islamabad
Dushanbe
Kabul
Badakhshan
Badghis
Baghlan
Balkh
Bamian
Daykundi
Farah
Faryab
Ghazni
Ghor
Helmand
Herat
Jowzjan
Kabul
Kandahar
Kapisa
Khost
Kunar
Kunduz
Laghman
Logar
Nangarhar
Nimroz
Nuristani
Paktika
Paktiya
Panjshir
Parwan
Samangan
Sar-e-Pul
Takhar
Uruzgan
Wardak
Zabul
Population
Geography
Economy
Governance
Geopolitical map of Afghanistan
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, and Government of Afghanistan, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
2007/2008: A Profile of Afghanistan; Map Resources (map); Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (photos).
Page 4 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
In June 2011, the President announced that after nearly a decade of
conflict in Afghanistan, U.S. combat troops would be withdrawn in 2014.
The President also announced that the United States would remain
committed to supporting the development of a sovereign Afghanistan. In
May 2012, the United States signed the Enduring Strategic Partnership
Agreement with Afghanistan, outlining the goals for the future bilateral
relationship, and in November 2012, the two nations began negotiations
on a future bilateral security agreement that would govern any future role
for U.S. military forces. It is possible that some U.S. forces would remain
in Afghanistan to advise or assist the Afghan government after 2014;
however, no decisions have yet been made. U.S. forces in Afghanistan
have begun to draw down from an estimated high of 99,800 in March
2011 to approximately 66,000 in December 2012 and shift their role from
carrying out combat operations to advising and assisting Afghan forces
while transitioning lead security responsibilities to Afghan forces.
Afghanistan is scheduled to hold presidential elections in April 2014.
According to Department of State (State) officials, the 2014 election will
be the crucial test of Afghanistan’s political transition. (See fig. 2 for a
time line of selected events and U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan.)
Recent U.S.-Afghan Events
Page 5 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figure 2: Time Line of Selected Events and U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan, 2001-2012
Page 6 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
The U.S. strategic goal for Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al Qaeda and prevent its return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Specific
objectives in Afghanistan in support of this goal are to (1) deny safe
haven to al Qaeda and (2) deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the
Afghan government.
2
(See fig. 3 for a description of key strategies and
plans that collectively guide U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.)
2
The U.S. strategic goals for Afghanistan were recently changed from those that appeared
in the October 2012 U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. The goals as
they appeared in October 2012 were to (1) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its
affiliates and prevent their return to Afghanistan; and (2) build a partnership with the
Afghan people that ensures that the United States will be able to continue to target
terrorists and support a sovereign Afghan government.
Strategic Framework for
U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan
Page GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Kabul
Source: Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Mission to NATO, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Agency for International Development, UN, and government of Afghanistan documents;
Department of Defense (photo); Map Resources (map).
Crosscutting issues
Afghan documents and
international agreements
U.S. plans
and strategies
Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan
NATO plans
and documents
Bonn Agreement
December 2001
Afghan Compact
January 2006
Afghan
National
Development
Strategy
2008
London
Conference
Communiqué
January 2010
Kabul Process
July 2010
Bonn
Conference
Conclusions
December 2011
Chicago Summit
Declaration
May 2012
Operation Enduring
Freedom Campaign
Plan
November 2001
continuing
Status of
Forces
Agreement
May 2003
Afghanistan
and Pakistan
Regional
Stabilization
Strategy
November
2011
Supreme
Headquarters of
the Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE)
Operational Plan
June 2003
August 2012
International
Security
Assistance
Force
(ISAF)
Operational
Plan
March 2006
continuing
NATO
Strategic Plan
for Afghanistan
May 2012
North Atlantic
Council Initiating
Directive
October 2012
Security foundation
Governance
pillar
Rule
of
law
pillar
Socioeconomic
development
pillar
Reconciliation and reintegration
Role of women in society
Borders
Information initiatives
Regional cooperation
Enduring
Strategic
Partnership
Agreement
May 2012
Tokyo Conference
Declaration and
Framework
July 2012
Enduring
Presence
Plans
Post 2014
2012
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Objectives 2015
August 2012
Civil-Military
Strategic
Framework for
Afghanistan
October 2012
Strategic goal
Figure 3: Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan
Interactive graphic
• A print version of this graphic is also available in appendices IV and V.
Print instructions
Directions: Mouseover text to view more information.
Page 8 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
As of September 30, 2012, DOD had reported obligations of about $440
billion for Operation Enduring Freedom from September 2001 through the
end of fiscal year 2012. U.S. agencies allotted $6.6 billion for diplomatic
operations between fiscal years 2002 and 2012. U.S. agencies also
allotted $79.7 billion for reconstruction and relief in Afghanistan between
fiscal years 2002 and 2012 (see table 1). The United States, as well as
the international community, has focused its efforts in areas such as
training of the Afghan army and police, infrastructure development, and
economic growth.
Table 1: U.S. Allotments to Support Afghan Reconstruction and Relief by Category and Selected Accounts, Fiscal Years 2002-
2013
Dollars in millions
Fiscal years
2002-2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2002-2012
Total 2013 Request
International Affairs Programs $11,596 $2,813 $4,179 $2,689 $2,308 $23,586 $2,570
Security 3,186
a
534 648 471 391 5,229
656
—INCLE 1,787 484 589 400 324 3,584
600
—FMF 1,059 0 0 0 0 1,059
0
—Other 340 50 59 71 67 587
56
Governance and development 6,755
b
2,106 3,438 2,137 1,837 16,273 1,849
—ESF 5,621 2,048 3,346 2,068 1,837 14,919 1,849
—Other 1,134 58 92 70 0 1,354 0
Humanitarian
1,656
c
172
93
80
81
2,083
65
Department of Defense Programs 16,072 6,339 10,001 11,946 11,532 55,890 7,159
Security 14,570
d
5,813 9,558 10,996 10,582 51,518 6,155
—ASFF 13,060 5,607 9,167 10,619 10,200 48,653 5,749
—DOD CN 1,061 206 391 377 382 2,416 405
—Other 450 0 0 0 0 450 0
Governance and development 1,502
e
527 443 950 950 4,371 1,004
—CERP 952 527 443 400 400 2,721 425
—AIF 0 0 0 400 400 800 400
—Other 550 0 0 150 150 850 179
Drug Enforcement Administration
106
19
19
19
19
182
18
Total $27,774 $9,171 $14,199 $14,654 $13,859 $79,657 $9,747
Source: GAO analysis of Departments of Defense, Justice, and State data.
Funding for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan
Page 9 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Notes: Table 1 does not include funding provided for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Totals
may not add due to rounding.
a
INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
Other international affairs security includes International Military Education and Training (IMET);
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR); and Voluntary
Peacekeeping (PKO) funds.
b
ESF = Economic Support Fund. Other international affairs governance and development includes
Development Assistance (DA); Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS); Treasury Technical
Assistance; and International Organizations and Programs funds.
c
Humanitarian assistance includes Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA); Emergency Refugee
and Migration Assistance (ERMA); International Disaster Assistance (IDA); Transition Initiatives; Food
for Education/Food for Progress; U.S. food assistance programs authorized through Title I (Food for
Progress) and Title II (Food for Peace) of the Food for Peace Act (also known as P.L. 480); the Bill
Emerson Humanitarian Trust; and section 416(b) food aid funds.
d
ASFF = Afghan Security Forces Fund. DOD CN = Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and
Counter-Drug Activities. Other DOD security includes Train and Equip funds and National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1207 transfers.
e
CERP= Commander’s Emergency Response Program. AIF = Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. Other
Department of Defense governance and development include Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations (TFBSO) and Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) funds.
As shown in figure 4,
• $56.9 billion, more than two-thirds of the allotments, were provided to
support Afghanistan’s security in areas such as the development of
Afghan army and police forces and counternarcotics efforts.
• $20.6 billion, a quarter of the allotments, were provided to support
governance and development efforts such as the construction of
roads and schools.
• $2.1 billion, the remainder of the allotments, were provided for
humanitarian assistance.
Page 10 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figure 4: Breakout of U.S. Allotments to Support Afghan Reconstruction and Relief,
Fiscal Years 2002-2012
Since the issuance of our last Afghanistan key issues product in 2009,
3
we have issued over 50 products and provided numerous congressional
briefings on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Our work to date has covered key
issues outlined in the U.S. strategic framework, including: Afghanistan’s
security environment, the increase in insider attacks, the transition of
security from the United States and NATO to the Afghan government,
U.S. efforts to advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), costs and sustainability of ANSF, DOD planning for the
drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, U.S. support for Afghan governance,
Afghan donor dependency, U.S. development efforts, and oversight of
U.S. contracts and funds, among other issues and concerns. See
appendix VI for a list of related GAO products.
3
GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-473SP
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009).
Recent GAO Work and
Recommendations
Regarding Afghanistan
Page 11 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Over the course of our work on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, we have
recommended a range of improvements that should be considered in
program planning and implementation and identified conditions that affect
success. For example, we have made recommendations on a need for
improved interagency coordination and planning, such as the
development of plans that include measurable goals, specific time
frames, and cost estimates. We have also made recommendations on the
need for improved internal controls and oversight over U.S. funds and
contracts, such as the provision of adequate training of oversight
personnel and completion of preaward risk assessments prior to providing
direct assistance to Afghan government ministries. U.S. agencies have
generally concurred with our recommendations and have taken steps to
address a number of them, several of which are noted in the enclosures.
In addition, we have identified several existing conditions—such as the
security environment and the limited institutional capacity of the
Afghanistan government—that continue to create challenges to the
United State’s efforts to assist in securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding
Afghanistan.
This special publication represents an update to our April 2009 product,
Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, and is based on
our work to date. To generate a list of possible key issues, we reviewed
past products concerning Afghanistan (as well as the Iraq transition) by
GAO, cognizant agency inspectors general (including the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), the Congressional
Research Service, and research institutions. Working with GAO’s subject
matter experts, we narrowed the list of issues and identified potential
oversight questions. We interviewed cognizant agency officials located in
Afghanistan and Washington, D.C., from DOD, including U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR-A), and U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers; North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); State; the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID); and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), including the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance
and Training, and International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program. We used these interviews to refine our key issues, gain updated
information and data, follow up on actions taken regarding our past
recommendations, and identify relevant lessons learned from the Iraq
transition. We also worked with the officials to determine what portions of
our past classified or restricted work could be presented in a public
Scope and
Methodology of This
Review
Page 12 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
product. We then synthesized this information to provide a balanced and
comprehensive overview for each issue and pose oversight questions.
We updated relevant data when possible, and performed additional data
reliability assessments when necessary. These additional assessments
were only conducted on data that we had not previously reported; all
other data were assessed as part of our work to date. We assessed the
reliability of the U.S. government budget data for U.S. military operations
and reconstruction and relief efforts in Afghanistan by comparing data
received from other agencies and asking knowledgeable officials to
corroborate and clarify the data.
We updated our estimate of Afghanistan’s total public expenditures and
converted the data from U.S. fiscal and Afghanistan’s solar years to
calendar years. To estimate Afghanistan’s total public expenditures, we
reviewed the government of Afghanistan’s budget (revenues,
expenditures, and donor contributions) and expenditure data from DOD
and State in addition to publicly available expenditure and donor
assistance data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s Development Assistance Database, the World Bank’s
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, United Nations Development
Program’s Law and Order Trust Fund, India’s budget documents, and
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan, among others. Based on our analysis of these
documents, we estimated Afghanistan’s total public expenditures, on- and
off-budget, disaggregated by security and nonsecurity expenditures. Our
estimates are based on actual disbursements, not budget estimates.
Afghanistan’s budget cycle was organized around solar years. For
example, solar year 2010/11 begins on March 21, 2010, and ends on
March 20, 2011. However, since the latest budget cycle, Afghanistan has
switched its reporting to calendar years. We converted Afghanistan’s
solar year and U.S. fiscal year data by using a quarterly adjustment and
assuming a continuous flow of disbursements without quarterly variation.
In most cases, we determined that the data mentioned above were
reliable enough for our purposes, and noted our concerns regarding any
data reliability issues. The information on foreign law in this report is not
the product of our original analysis, but is derived from interviews and
secondary sources. Further information on our scope and methodologies,
as well as data reliability assessments, can be found in the reports
referenced in appendix VI.
Page 13 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
We prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General to
conduct work on GAO’s initiative because of broad congressional interest
in the oversight and accountability of U.S. funds provided to Afghanistan
and to assist Congress with its oversight responsibilities. In addition,
Section 1220 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013,
4
requires GAO to report on any substantial updates to the
campaign plan for Afghanistan. Appendices IV and V of this report
provide an analysis of recent updates to various documents, including the
Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, that constitute the
strategic framework for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
5
We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to February 2013
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOD, DOJ,
State, and USAID. Each agency informed us that they were not providing
formal comments. However, each provided technical comments, which
we have incorporated into the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. In addition, we are sending copies of this product to the
President and Vice President of the United States, and the Secretaries of
Defense and State; the Attorney General of the United States, the USAID
Administrator; and other interested parties. The report is also available at
no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff
4
Pub. L. No. 112-239 (Jan. 2, 2013).
5
In 2012, GAO provided updated information in accordance with its requirements under
section 1226 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub. L.
No.111-84 [October 28, 2009]), focusing on the progress of U.S. civilian-military plans to
transition lead security responsibility to the Afghan government (GAO-12-598C), the cost
of sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (GAO-12-438SU), and Afghanistan’s
donor dependency (GAO-11-948R). These reports are cited in Appendix VI.
Agency Comments
Page 14 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
have any questions about this report, please contact Charles Michael
Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov, or the
individual(s) listed at the end of each enclosure. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this product. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this product are listed in appendix VII.
Loren Yager Janet St. Laurent
Managing Director Managing Director
International Affairs and Trade Defense Capabilities and
Management
Enclosures
Page 15 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
List of Addressees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable James M. Inhofe
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chairman
The Honorable Jeff Sessions
Ranking Member
Budget Committee
United States Senate
The Honorable Robert Menendez
Chairman
The Honorable Bob Corker
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable Thomas R. Carper
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Coburn
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Lindsey Graham
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Page 16 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ed Royce
Chairman
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Kay Granger
Chairman
The Honorable Nita Lowey
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Jason Chaffetz
Chairman
The Honorable John F. Tierney
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Page 17 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
Several factors have contributed to Afghanistan’s current high-threat
security environment, challenging the international community and Afghan
efforts to implement programs throughout the country. For example,
insurgents continue to find safe havens in Pakistan from which to launch
attacks. Additionally, the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan continues to be a
source of funding for insurgent groups and undermine the Afghan
government’s effort to improve political stability, economic growth, and
rule of law. More recent issues include an increase in attacks on U.S. and
coalition personnel by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) commonly
referred to as “insider attacks,” as well as the required transition of some
security responsibilities from private contractors to a state-led enterprise—
known as the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).
Key Findings
The security situation in Afghanistan, as measured by enemy-initiated
attacks, has deteriorated since 2005, affecting U.S. and allied
reconstruction operations. DOD attack data as of December 2012 show
that the pattern of enemy-initiated attacks has remained seasonal in
nature, generally peaking from June through September each year and
then declining during the winter months (see fig. 5).
Figure 5: Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported by Type in Afghanistan, December 2005 through
December 2012
Insider attacks on U.S. and coalition military personnel have increased,
raising questions about efforts to protect U.S. personnel working with
ANSF. One of the central tenets of the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan is enhanced unit
partnering in which coalition units provide training, assistance, and
development functions to ANSF units until they are able to conduct
Enclosure I: Afghanistan’s Security
Environment
Background
Afghanistan’s security environment
continues to undermine the Afghan
government’s and international
community’s reconstruction efforts.
In December 2009, recognizing that
the situation in Afghanistan had
become more grave, the U.S.
President announced his decision
to deploy additional troops to
Afghanistan to disrupt and defeat
extremists. In June 2011, the U.S.
President announced that combat
troops would be withdrawn in 2014.
Afghanistan’s Security
Situation Remains Volatile
Insider Attacks on U.S. Military
Personnel Have Increased
Page 18 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
operations independently. However, between 2007 and 2012, ANSF killed
or wounded over 290 U.S. and international coalition personnel in 87
attacks. The number of these attacks has increased over time (see fig. 6).
Among the attacks with identified causes, DOD and NATO have identified
the personal motivations of individual ANSF members—including stress
and ideological beliefs of attackers with no previous ties to insurgents—as
the largest single cause of insider attacks. According to one ISAF and
several DOD officials, as the United States and ISAF continue to shift their
focus from a combat to an all advise-and-assist mission, larger numbers of
personnel may be exposed to a possible insider attack.
Figure 6: Number of Insider Attacks from 2007 through 2012
In April 2012, we reported on DOD’s increased efforts to reduce the
number of insider attacks, but also identified a lack of sharing between
DOD and the Afghan government of biometric data (such as fingerprints,
iris scans, and facial photographs) that is used to help screen ANSF
members before they come into contact with DOD personnel. We
recommended that DOD take additional steps to renew the sharing of
biometric data on ANSF members and candidates with Afghanistan. DOD
agreed with and is making efforts to address our recommendation.
Partially because of the increased frequency of insider attacks, ISAF
reduced some partnering missions between ISAF and ANSF for a period
in September 2012 while new safety protocols were implemented.
NATO and Afghanistan are shifting from the use of private security
contractors (PSCs) to the Afghan government-owned APPF, and this
transition may affect the security of the military, U.S. civilians, and
implementing partners attempting to deliver development assistance
throughout the country. An August 2010 decree by Afghan President
Karzai directed the dissolution of PSCs in favor of APPF, to provide a fee-
for-service force to secure international, governmental, and
nongovernmental operations, sites, and facilities. According to U.S.
officials, APPF faces various impediments to providing security services to
DOD and USAID and its implementing partners, including an immature
logistics system, limited recruiting, training and command and control
capabilities, equipment shortages, and a lack of qualified English
speakers. These impediments could affect APPF operational capabilities
and the transition at ISAF sites to APPF protection, and may result in
increased security costs, among other things.
Oversight Questions
1. What is the status of DOD’s efforts to reduce the number of insider
attacks, such as renewing biometric data sharing with the Afghan
government?
2. With the implementation of APPF, what are the effects on security for
U.S. agencies and their implementing partners and the cost of
providing that security in Afghanistan?
The Introduction of the Afghan
Public Protection Force May
Increase Security Concerns for
U.S. Military and Civilian
Operations
Points of Contact
For more information, contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
(202) 512-7331,
johnsoncm@gao.gov
Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431,
russellc@gao.gov
Page 19 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
In November 2010, the Afghan government and NATO agreed upon a
plan for transferring lead security responsibilities from the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014 with the drawdown of
international forces. Specifically, the Afghan government and ISAF—
including the United States—agreed to a transition process that
emphasizes a shift in ISAF’s role from conducting combat missions to
advising and assisting ANSF. Lead security responsibility in Afghanistan is
defined as responsibility and accountability for planning and conducting
operations within a designated area, with ISAF support as required. For
example, ANSF continues to rely on coalition forces for, among others, air,
logistics, intelligence, and medical evacuation support. The successful
transfer of lead security responsibility from international forces to ANSF is
critical to countering insurgents and creating sustainable security and
allows the withdrawal of international troops.
Key Findings
The transfer of lead security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF is a joint
ISAF-Afghan decision-making process that is under way. Under this
process, ISAF and Afghan officials determine the readiness of geographic
areas to transition based on the following four factors:
1. the capability of ANSF to take on additional security tasks with less
assistance from ISAF;
2. the level of security needed to allow the population to pursue routine
daily activities;
3. the degree of development of local governance; and
4. whether ISAF is properly positioned to withdraw as ANSF capabilities
increase and threat levels diminish.
The transition for each geographic area is a multiphased process, with
ISAF tracking progress through metrics, such as security and governance.
The areas (provinces, districts, and/or cities) are grouped into one of five
tranches for transition. As of December 2012, the transition of four of the
five tranches had been announced, and over 87 percent of the Afghan
population was living in areas under Afghan lead security with the military
support of U.S. and coalition partners. By mid-2013, it is expected that all
areas will have entered the transition process and that by December 2014
the transition will be complete.
According to ISAF, ANSF would need to be under effective Afghan civilian
control and fully capable of addressing security challenges on a
sustainable and irreversible basis for the transition to be successful.
However, the readiness of the Afghan government to sustain ANSF has
been questioned. For example, we previously highlighted concerns raised
about the cost to sustain ANSF (see encl. III). Additionally, in October
2012, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) reported that the Afghan government would likely be incapable of
fully sustaining ANSF facilities after the transition (SIGAR. ANSF
Background
Since 2001, the United States
and its NATO partners have been
responsible for securing
Afghanistan and leading the effort
to secure, stabilize, and rebuild
Afghanistan. In 2010, the United
States and the international
community announced their
intentions to transition security to
the Afghan government. This
transition is under way and is
expected to be completed by the
end of 2014.
Transition of Lead Security
from ISAF to ANSF Is a Joint
ISAF-Afghan Process
Enclosure II: Transition of Lead Security to
Afghan Security Forces
Page 20 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Facilities: Concerns with Funding, Oversight, and Sustainability for
Operations & Maintenance. Washington, D.C.: Audit 13-1, Oct. 30, 2012).
DOD and ISAF have reported progress in increasing ANSF capabilities,
but the tool they use to assess the performance of ANSF units changed
several times. When we reported on Afghan National Army capability in
January 2011, the highest capability rating level for a unit was
“independent,” meaning that it could execute the full spectrum of its
mission without any assistance from coalition forces. As of August 2011,
however, the highest level had changed to “independent with advisors,”
meaning that a unit could execute its mission, but could also request
coalition forces when necessary (see GAO-12-951T). Under these lower
standards, more units have been rated at the highest level. In November
2012, DOD reported progress in increasing the capability of ANSF, with 14
percent of army and 13 percent of police units rated at the highest level of
capability. In addition, DOD reported that 43 percent of army and 19
percent of police units were rated at the second highest level, “effective
with advisors.” DOD acknowledged that the changes to the rating levels,
as well as the elimination of certain requirements for validating units, were
partly responsible for the increase in ANSF units rated at the highest level.
As part of the overall transition of lead security, NATO's mission in
Afghanistan is shifting from a combat role to an advise-and-assist mission.
For the U.S. contribution, DOD has used a variety of approaches to
provide U.S. forces to carry out the advise-and-assist mission. For
example, in early 2012, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps began to deploy
small teams of advisors with specialized capabilities—referred to as
Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams—that are located throughout
Afghanistan, to work with Afghan army and police units from the
headquarters to the battalion level, and advise them in areas such as
command and control, intelligence, and logistics. More recently, the Army
began tailoring the composition and mission of its brigade combat teams
to further focus on advising efforts. The Army and Marine Corps, however,
have continued to face some challenges when supplying these teams,
such as in providing the required field grade officers and specialized
capabilities. Our past work examining the use of advisor teams in Iraq and
Afghanistan highlighted certain areas that we believe are relevant to
DOD’s plans to provide the Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams in
support of the current mission in Afghanistan. Specifically, we have
identified challenges related to the sourcing and training of personnel,
command-and-control relationships, and support. Given the key role of
advisory teams in supporting the transition process, these areas will be
important considerations for DOD as it continues to refine its use of
advisor personnel to mentor and develop ANSF.
Oversight Questions
1. What is the status of the transition process in those areas where
ANSF has taken the lead in security?
2. Given the changing measures of ANSF capabilities, to what extent is
ANSF capable of addressing security challenges on a sustainable
basis?
3. What enabling capabilities, including advisor support, will DOD need to
continue to provide to ANSF beyond 2014?
4. What steps is DOD taking to address challenges in providing advisor
personnel, in terms of number of teams, ranks, and specialized
capabilities?
ANSF Capabilities Have
Reportedly Increased, but the
Tool Used to Assess ANSF
Performance Has Changed
ISAF’s Mission Is Evolving
from Combat to Advise-and-
Assist
Points of Contact
For more information, contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
(202) 512-7331,
johnsoncm@gao.gov
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619,
pickups@gao.gov
Page 21 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
Helping Afghanistan build capable and sustainable security forces is
critical to the success of transitioning lead security responsibilities to
Afghanistan by the end of 2014. At the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the
international community pledged to continue to assist in financing the
sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) beyond 2014.
The World Bank, the Afghan government, and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) have reported that Afghanistan will likely need donor
assistance to fund ANSF until at least 2021. DOD requested $5.7 billion to
support ANSF for fiscal year 2013, which, if approved, would bring the
total U.S. funding levels for ANSF for fiscal years 2002 through 2013 to
over $57 billion. In Chicago, the Afghan government and the international
community agreed with setting a goal for Afghanistan to assume full
financial responsibility for its security forces no later than 2024.
Key Findings
Our analysis shows that projected Afghan domestic revenues will be
insufficient to cover the cost of ANSF through fiscal year 2015. Our
analysis of DOD data estimates that the cost of continuing to build and
sustain ANSF will be at least $25 billion for fiscal years 2013 through
2017. Multiple factors are expected to influence the final cost of sustaining
ANSF, including the size of the force—which is expected to decline,
according to a preliminary model, from 352,000 to 228,500 by 2017—as
well as planned reductions in infrastructure and training costs by 2014.
According to DOD, continuous efforts are made to adjust ANSF
capabilities and requirements to achieve cost reductions, including the
Afghan First (the purchase of goods and services from Afghan producers)
and Afghan Right (building and procuring items according to Afghan
specifications) initiatives. At the Chicago Summit, the Afghan government
pledged to devote at least $500 million in 2015 and annually thereafter to
funding ANSF, which is about 14 percent of its 2015 projected domestic
revenues. However, even if the Afghan government committed 100
percent of its projected domestic revenues to funding ANSF, this amount
would cover only about 75 percent of the cost of supporting security forces
in fiscal year 2015 and would leave the Afghan government no revenues
to cover any non-security-related programs, such as public health.
At the Chicago Summit, the United States and its allies laid out a plan for
future funding for ANSF; the U.S. annual contribution is projected to
decline over time but still cover the majority of the costs. Our analysis
shows that donors funded about 95 percent ($33.7 billion) of Afghanistan’s
total security expenditures, with the United States funding approximately
91 percent ($32.4 billion) of that amount from 2006 through 2011. On the
basis of projections of U.S. and other donor support for ANSF for fiscal
years 2012 through 2017, we estimate that there will be a gap each year
from 2015 through 2017 between ANSF costs and donor pledges if
additional contributions are not made (see fig. 7). According to State,
excluding Afghan and U.S. funds, the international community has
pledged over $1 billion annually to support ANSF from 2015 through 2017.
Enclosure III: Future Cost and Sustainability
of Afghan Security Forces
Background
An international coalition of
countries, including the United
States, other NATO members, and
other nations, has made
contributions to build ANSF, which
consists primarily of the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and the
Afghan National Police (ANP). U.S.
agencies allotted over $52 billion to
build and sustain ANSF from fiscal
years 2002 through 2012.
Afghanistan’s Domestic
Revenue Will Not Cover the
Expected Cost of Its Security
Forces
The United States and the
International Community
Committed to Fund ANSF, but
a Funding Gap Is Anticipated
Page 22 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figure 7: Projected U.S. and Other Donor Support for ANSF
a
a
These projections are based on data and planning assumptions from early 2012 and,
according to DOD officials, are subject to change based on ongoing planning efforts to
develop and sustain ANSF force structures.
b
GAO analysis of the projected costs of ANSF is completed by fiscal year, while annual
pledged amounts by individual countries are based on calendar year.
c
Pledges were converted to U.S. dollars using January 24, 2013 currency exchange rates.
Although DOD has developed ANSF cost estimates beyond 2014, it has
not provided its long-term cost estimates for sustaining ANSF in its
semiannual reports to Congress. Our analysis of DOD data estimates the
cost of continuing to support ANSF from 2013 through 2017 over $25
billion, raising concerns about the sustainability of ANSF. We previously
recommended, and Congress mandated, that DOD report to Congress
about the long-term cost to sustain ANSF. While DOD’s semiannual
reports issued to date include information on current or upcoming fiscal
year funding requirements for ANSF and donor contributions, estimates
for long-term costs are absent. DOD stated that because the long-term
ANSF cost estimates depend on a constantly changing operational
environment, it provides cost information to Congress through briefings
and testimony, as appropriate. This mechanism, however, does not allow
for independent assessment of DOD’s estimates to assist Congress as it
considers future budget decisions.
Oversight Questions
1. If the ANSF force size does not decrease as expected, what are the
alternative cost estimates and sources of funding for a larger force?
2. To what extent are the United States and the international community
identifying additional cost savings for ANSF?
3. To what extent have the United States and the international
community developed plans to cover possible ANSF funding gaps?
Despite Mandate, Long-Term
Cost Estimates for Sustaining
ANSF Have Not Been Routinely
Provided to Congress
Points of Contact
For more information, contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
(202) 512-7331,
johnsoncm@gao.gov
Page 23 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
With the U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan, DOD faces an
unprecedented logistical challenge. Removing equipment from
Afghanistan requires transiting routes with physical and geopolitical
challenges. These factors could increase costs and slow the drawdown of
an estimated 50,000 vehicles and more than 90,000 containers. DOD has
begun planning for the reduction of hundreds of thousands of major end
items—that is, equipment important to operational readiness such as
aircraft, motorized and towed vehicles, and weapons—worth more than
$36 billion. To drawdown the major end items, DOD has three primary
options: remove the equipment from Afghanistan; transfer it to another
agency or to the Afghan government; or destroy it in-theater. According to
one DOD estimate, the cost of removal and transfer of items could be
almost $6 billion. Senior DOD officials who oversaw the logistics for the
military withdrawal from Iraq see a greater challenge in Afghanistan.
Key Findings
DOD has applied some, but not all, relevant lessons learned from the Iraq
drawdown to its planning for equipment reductions in Afghanistan. For
example, the drawdown from Iraq demonstrated the importance of early
planning for equipment drawdown, and the military services have applied
this lesson by issuing guidance outlining the processes and procedures for
drawing down equipment in Afghanistan. However, not all lessons from
the Iraq drawdown have been applied. For example, during the Iraq
drawdown, the Army noted that contractor equipment should be
inventoried and entered into an automated records accounting system.
However, DOD officials told us that full inventory of contractor equipment
has not yet been attained in Afghanistan. In September 2011, we
recommended that DOD implement a process to maintain visibility over
contractor equipment. At the time, DOD agreed with the recommendation.
DOD has planned for the reduction of equipment from Afghanistan in the
following three ways, but challenges remain:
(a) Established command structures and guidance. DOD’s Central
Command designated U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) as the
command responsible for equipment drawdown. USFOR-A has published
a base closure and transfer guide that outlines processes for the handling
of equipment during transition.
(b) Made efforts to improve property accountability. In September 2011,
USFOR-A initiated an inventory of all the equipment in Afghanistan to
identify items not previously accounted for in DOD’s systems of record,
but DOD officials acknowledged that they lack visibility over contractor
equipment.
(c) Established and expanded transportation options. DOD has increased
the capacity of air/sea transportation routes out of Afghanistan (see fig. 8),
but the land/sea routes from Afghanistan have limited operational
capability for the return of equipment. U.S. Transportation Command is
currently conducting tests to determine the capacity of the land/sea routes
Background
In June 2011, the United States
announced plans to reduce the
number of U.S. troops in
Afghanistan in accordance with
U.S. objectives to transition to an
Afghan-led security presence by
2014. DOD completed the
reduction of 33,000 troops from
Afghanistan in September 2012,
but much equipment has
accumulated in the country through
10 years of inflow without
corresponding outflow.
DOD Has Applied Some
Lessons Learned from Iraq to
Planning for the Drawdown of
Equipment in Afghanistan
DOD Established Command
Structures and Guidance,
Property Accountability, and
Transportation Options for the
Drawdown of Equipment in
Afghanistan
Enclosure IV: DOD Planning for the Drawdown
of Equipment in Afghanistan
Page 24 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
for the return of equipment from Afghanistan. Because of geopolitical
complexities in the region it is unknown when these land/sea routes will be
operational for the removal of equipment. As a result, DOD has had to rely
on a combination of air/sea transport, a more costly transportation option.
DOD transportation costs for the return of equipment vary depending on
such factors as the type of equipment, route, and mode of transportation.
For example, according to DOD data, transportation costs for the return of
a single vehicle or container can range from $8,000 to $153,000,
depending on the option employed (see fig. 8).
Figure 8: Cost of Various Routes for the Removal of Containers and
Vehicles from Afghanistan
Consistent with DOD's supply chain materiel management policy, DOD
has issued additional guidance requiring the military services to assess
and document the costs and benefits when equipment is transferred or
destroyed. However, there is no specific guidance requiring the military
services to assess and document the costs and benefits of returning
equipment, and they have not done so. Returning equipment involves
transportation, repair, and storage costs that could be weighed against
benefits to determine whether it is actually cost-effective to return it. Based
on our analysis, the return of these items without full consideration of the
costs and benefits is particularly problematic for unneeded items. When
such excess items are returned without full consideration of costs and
benefits, there is increased risk of unnecessary transportation and storage
expenditures. In December 2012, we recommended that the military
services conduct and document analyses to compare the costs and
benefits of returning excess items and use these analyses in decisions
regarding their return (see GAO-13-185R). DOD concurred.
Oversight Questions
1. To what extent does DOD’s execution of the equipment drawdown
support drawdown objectives and milestones with an efficient use of
resources?
2. To what extent has DOD developed mitigation plans to address
potential cost and operational impacts for removing equipment if there
are disruptions to land-based supply routes?
3. To what extent do decision makers have sufficient information on the
costs and benefits of returning excess items?
DOD Has Not Fully Considered
the Costs and Benefits of
Returning Excess Equipment
from Afghanistan
Point of Contact
For more information, contact:
Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431,
russellc@gao.gov
Page 25 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
The international community, including approximately 50 countries and
international entities such as the World Bank and the United Nations, has
provided significant support to help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. U.S.
agencies have allotted over $81.7 billion for reconstruction and relief in
Afghanistan between fiscal years 2002 and 2012, and the U.S. President
has requested over $9.7 billion for these purposes for fiscal year 2013. In
July 2012, at the international conference in Tokyo, Japan, donor
countries and international organizations committed to continue supporting
the Afghan economy through 2015 and beyond. Donors also raised
concerns about Afghanistan’s dependency on donors to fund its public
expenditures—funds spent to provide public services to the Afghan
population, such as security, infrastructure projects, and government
salaries—and continued reconstruction efforts. We have raised concerns
about Afghanistan’s inability to fund planned government expenditures
without foreign assistance (see GAO-11-948R).
Key Findings
Afghanistan’s domestic revenues funded about 10 percent of its estimated
total public expenditures from 2006 to 2011. Domestic revenue grew from
$0.6 billion to $2.0 billion from 2006 to 2011 (see fig. 9), an increase of
over 230 percent. At the same time, Afghanistan’s estimated total public
expenditures grew from $5.8 billion to $17.4 billion, an increase of over
200 percent, maintaining a gap between revenues and expenditures.
Figure 9: Afghanistan’s Domestic Revenues from 2006 to 2011
Donors funded approximately 90 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total
public expenditures from 2006 to 2011, with the United States providing
64 percent of that amount (see fig. 10). The United States funded an
estimated 91 percent of Afghanistan’s total security expenditures and
about 37 percent of Afghanistan’s total nonsecurity expenditures between
2006 to 2011. In numerous reports and congressional briefings, we have
Enclosure V: Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence
Background
Afghanistan is one of the world’s
poorest countries and ranks near
the bottom of virtually every
development indicator category.
The nation's gross domestic
product (GDP) is estimated at
about $18 billion for 2011.
According to the most recent
figures, approximately 35 percent of
Afghanistan’s population is
unemployed and lives below the
poverty line, suffering from
shortages of housing, clean
drinking water, and electricity.
Afghanistan’s Domestic
Revenues Do Not Cover Its
Total Public Expenditures
The United States and
International Partners Funded
about 90 Percent of
Afghanistan’s Estimated Total
Public Expenditures
Page 26 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
raised concerns about Afghanistan’s inability to fund planned government
expenditures without foreign assistance and raised questions about the
sustainability of U.S.-funded road, agriculture, and water infrastructure
development projects, as well as Afghanistan’s ability to sustain its
national security forces.
Figure 10: Afghanistan’s Total Public Expenditures from 2006 to 2011
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Donors funded, on average, 56 percent of Afghanistan’s on-budget
expenditures and 100 percent of its off-budget expenditures. Between
2006 and 2011 about 79 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated $73 billion in
total public expenditures were “off-budget”—that is, funded by the
international community outside of the Afghan national budget, such as
equipment for Afghan National Security Forces. The remaining
expenditures were “on-budget”—that is, within the government’s budget
and funded by domestic revenues and donor contributions. As a result, a
majority of Afghanistan’s total public expenditures were outside the direct
control of the Afghan government.
The international community has pledged to continue to support
Afghanistan through 2017 if certain metrics regarding reform in
Afghanistan are met. Given Afghanistan’s future revenue generation
projections and expenditures, the country will likely continue to be reliant
on the donor community through at least 2024. In July 2012, the
international community committed to providing over $16 billion for
Afghanistan’s economic development through 2015. The community also
committed to sustaining support, through 2017, at or near the levels of the
past decade to respond to the fiscal gap estimated by the World Bank and
the Afghan government.
Oversight Questions
1. To what extent are U.S. programs assisting Afghanistan’s ability to
increase domestic revenue and close the gap between revenues and
total public expenditures?
2. What is the estimated amount of U.S. and other donors’ financial
contributions to Afghanistan expected to be through 2017?
Donors Funded Over Half of
Afghanistan’s On-Budget
Expenditures and All Off-
Budget Expenditures
International Community Has
Pledged Continued Support
Points of Contact
For more information, contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
(202) 512-7331,
johnsoncm@gao.gov
Page 27 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its
development aid through the Afghan government budget within 2 years.
Such direct assistance is intended to help develop the capacity of Afghan
government ministries. The United States more than tripled its awards of
such direct assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2010 compared with
fiscal year 2009, using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds.
Improving the Afghan government’s management of public finances is
critical to the successful transition of more development aid being
provided though the Afghan government budget. According to U.S.
officials and documents, a challenge to this effort is the high level of
corruption that exists throughout the Afghan government. Persistent
corruption in Afghanistan undermines security and the people’s belief in
the government, as well as effective accountability of U.S. funds provided
directly to the Afghan government.
Key Findings
The United States continues to make efforts to improve Afghanistan’s
public financial management capacity to develop a budget, expend funds,
and increase accountability and transparency. For example, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of
the Treasury and Defense (DOD) have supported the Afghan
government’s goals to improve its capacity to develop a national budget
and expend funds through various activities, such as USAID projects that
provide technical assistance and training to Afghan civil servants. A
number of factors, however, including high levels of corruption in
Afghanistan, pose ongoing challenges to these programs.
We found in 2011 that U.S. government efforts were aligned with Afghan
government goals; however, the U.S. government could not fully
determine the overall extent to which its efforts had improved the Afghan
government’s public financial management capacity because (1) U.S.
agencies have reported mixed results; and (2) weaknesses in USAID’s
performance management frameworks, such as lack of performance
targets and data, prevent reliable assessments of its results (see GAO-11-
907). In September 2011 we recommended that for public financial
management efforts USAID take steps to establish performance targets in
its Mission Performance Management Plan (PMP) and ensure that
implementing partners’ PMPs include baselines and approved targets,
among other recommendations. In November 2011, USAID approved the
contractor’s updated performance management plan for its only remaining
public financial management capacity project to include baseline and
targets for each indicator. Addressing concerns about the capacity of
Afghan officials to administer larger amounts of funding for development
and public services programs is important, as more donor funding is
expected to be provided directly to Afghanistan’s budget in 2013 and
beyond.
Background
Since 2002, U.S. agencies have
collectively allotted over $80 billion
to help stabilize Afghanistan and
build the Afghan government’s
capacity to provide security,
enhance governance, and develop
a sustainable economy. The United
States provides assistance to
Afghanistan through contracts and
assistance instruments, such as
grants and cooperative
agreements, and in the form of
direct assistance, or “on-budget”
assistance—funding provided
through the Afghan national budget
for use by its ministries.
U.S. Efforts to Improve
Afghanistan’s Financial
Management Capacity
Continue
Enclosure VI: Oversight and Accountability of
U.S. Funds to Support Afghanistan
Page 28 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
USAID and DOD have taken steps to help ensure the accountability of
their direct assistance to Afghan ministries. In 2011, although we found
that USAID had established and generally complied with various financial
and other controls in its direct assistance agreements (such as requiring
Afghan ministries to maintain separate bank accounts and records subject
to audit), it had not always assessed the risks in providing direct
assistance before awarding funds (see GAO-11-710). For example,
USAID had not completed preaward risk assessments in two of the eight
cases of bilateral assistance we identified, despite the USAID
administrator’s prior commitment to Congress that the agency would not
proceed with direct assistance to an Afghan public institution before
assessing its capabilities. USAID has since taken steps to respond to our
recommendations to address these issues, including issuing new agency
policies on risk assessments. We also found that DOD had established
procedures in 2011 governing its direct assistance to Afghan ministries,
following our discussions with DOD about our initial findings.
Figure 11: U.S. Dollars and Afghan Afghanis
To provide a higher level of accountability for U.S. and international
assistance funds, the Afghan government and the international community
agreed at the Tokyo Conference in 2012 to implement accountability
mechanisms including the Mutual Accountability Framework, which was
designed to ensure that the Afghan government is achieving governance
and development goals. Going forward, the Afghan government and the
international community are expected to monitor performance in five major
areas of governance and development and determine a time line for
achieving Framework goals. Additionally, following the Tokyo Conference,
the Afghan President presented an anticorruption decree enumerating
specific actions that the Afghan government will take to improve
governance and the rule of law.
Oversight Questions
1. What steps have U.S. agencies taken to help ensure that
anticorruption efforts in Afghanistan will enhance accountability of U.S.
funds in Afghanistan?
2. To what extent is the Afghan government prepared to handle higher
levels of direct assistance, given the capacity challenges faced
throughout the government?
3. To what extent is the Mutual Accountability Framework designed to be
effective in ensuring that the Afghan government is achieving
governance and development goals?
U.S. Agencies Took Steps to
Enhance Accountability of
Direct Assistance to
Afghanistan
A Mutual Accountability
Framework Designed to
Improve Accountability of U.S.
and International Funds to
Afghanistan Is to Be
Implemented
Point of Contact
For more information, contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
(202) 512-7331,
johnsoncm@gao.gov
Page 29 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
U.S. agencies have allotted almost $20 billion for development efforts in
Afghanistan since 2002 through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State
(State). These agencies have undertaken thousands of development
activities in Afghanistan through multiple programs and accounts. In a
number of cases, however, systemic weaknesses in oversight and
monitoring of development project and program performance in
Afghanistan exist, and the various programs and accounts used to
execute development activities in Afghanistan overlap to some degree
across categories of development assistance. While such overlap could
be beneficial in terms of synergy and unity of effort, it also creates the
potential for duplication of efforts if plans and activities are not properly
coordinated.
Key Findings
Oversight of the billions of dollars provided to U.S. development programs
in Afghanistan has been enhanced. We have previously reported on
systemic weaknesses in USAID’s oversight and monitoring of the
performance of projects and programs carried out by its implementing
partners in Afghanistan. In 2010 we reported that USAID did not
consistently follow its established performance management and
evaluation procedures with regard to its agriculture and water sector
projects. For example, only two of the seven USAID-funded agricultural
programs included in our prior review had targets for all of their
performance indicators. We concluded that, in the absence of consistent
application of its existing performance management and evaluation
procedures, USAID’s programs were more vulnerable to corruption,
waste, fraud, and abuse. In response to our recommendations to improve
its performance oversight and monitoring, USAID took several steps
including issuing a new performance monitoring plan and approving its
implementing partners performance targets.
The four main U.S. development programs and accounts in Afghanistan
have similar goals and activities, overlap to some degree, and may
duplicate each other’s efforts (see table 1 for a description of those
programs and accounts). Programs administered by USAID and DOD
funded similar activities in Afghanistan across similar, broadly defined
categories of assistance: agriculture, democracy and governance,
education and health, energy and electricity, economic growth, and
transportation. We found in fiscal year 2011 that these programs were
implemented in many of the same Afghan provinces and districts—in 33 of
the 34 provinces and in 249 of the 399 districts (see GAO-13-34).
According to agency officials, these overlapping development efforts can
be beneficial, provided that agencies leverage their respective expertise
and coordinate efforts. However, the officials also acknowledged that such
overlap creates the potential for duplication of efforts if plans and activities
are not properly coordinated.
Enclosure VII: Oversight and Streamlining of
Development Assistance to Afghanistan
Background
The United States has devoted
significant funding and efforts in
Afghanistan to development
activities and programs. Its
strategic framework identifies socio-
economic development as a key
pillar of achieving its objectives of
countering insurgent activity in
Afghanistan.
Oversight of U.S. Programmatic
Development Funds Has Been
Enhanced
U.S. Development Efforts in
Afghanistan Overlap and May
Duplicate Each Other
Page 30 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Table 2: Major U.S.-Administered Programs or Accounts Used to Fund Development Efforts in Afghanistan
Economic Support Fund
(ESF)
Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP)
a
Task Force for
Business and Stability
Operations (TFBSO)
Afghanistan
Infrastructure Fund
(AIF)
Primary agency or agencies responsible USAID DOD DOD DOD and State
Fiscal year in which funding for
Afghanistan began
2002 2004 2009 2011
Program or account description for
Afghanistan
Supports Afghan
government in its efforts to
promote economic growth,
establish a democratic and
capable state governed by
the rule of law, and
provide basic services for
its people.
Enables U.S. commanders in
Afghanistan to carry out small-
scale projects designed to
meet urgent humanitarian
relief and reconstruction needs
in their areas of responsibility.
Supports projects to help
reduce violence,
enhance stability, and
support economic
normalcy through
strategic business and
economic opportunities.
Supports high-priority,
large-scale
infrastructure projects
that support the U.S.
civilian-military effort in
Afghanistan.
Funding provided in fiscal year 2011
(millions)
$2,068
b
$400 $224 $400
Total funding provided since inception
(millions)
b
$14,919
$3,439 $555 $800
Source: GAO analysis of Office of Management and Budget and agency data.
a
CERP may also fund some nondevelopment activities. We exclude nondevelopment
CERP activities from our analyses in this table.
b
U.S. agencies use a variety of methods to coordinate development efforts
in Afghanistan, but lack a single database to share and retain data. Our
analysis of USAID’s development activities and DOD’s CERP activities
identified potentially duplicative development projects; however, we could
not conclusively determine whether or not these efforts had resulted in
duplication (providing the same goods and services to the same
beneficiaries) because of gaps and inconsistencies in USAID’s and
DOD’s respective databases. USAID and DOD officials cited informal
communication and interagency meetings as the primary method of
coordinating USAID and CERP efforts. However, the effectiveness of
such coordination may depend on the priorities of the staff involved and
could be hampered by high staff turnover and lack of data retention.
Funding is based on allocations and agency allotments for Afghanistan assistance.
In 2010 we recommended that agencies report their development efforts
in a shared database; however, agencies have made limited progress in
collecting and retaining critical data on development efforts in such a
database. USAID’s Afghan Info database has been designated as the
central repository of data for U.S. foreign assistance efforts in Afghanistan.
DOD has not reported its projects in the shared database, citing concerns
with the sensitive nature of its data, which USAID noted could be mitigated
by internal controls. We continue to believe that a shared database that
incorporates all U.S.-funded development efforts in Afghanistan, including
DOD’s CERP activities, is needed to help mitigate potential information-
sharing gaps and reduce the risk of duplication. In November 2012 we
asked Congress to consider requiring U.S. agencies to report information
on their development-related activities in a shared database. While USAID
agreed with this recommendation citing concerns about visibility into DOD
projects post-2014, DOD disagreed with the need for legislative action.
Oversight Questions
1. What steps are U.S. agencies taking to ensure that USAID has insight
into DOD projects?
2. What steps have U.S. agencies taken to develop a shared database
that includes all development efforts?
U.S. Agencies Use Various
Methods to Coordinate but
Lack a Shared Database That
Includes All Development
Efforts
Points of Contact
For more information, contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
(202) 512-7331,
johnsoncm@gao.gov
Page 31 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
Since 2001, contractors have played a key role in U.S. efforts to stabilize
and rebuild Afghanistan. Federal agencies have hired contractors to
increase agricultural capacity, train Afghan police, maintain weapons
systems, and provide security and logistical services to U.S. forces and
other personnel. As the United States moves forward with planning for the
drawdown of U.S. military forces and the transition to a civilian-led
presence in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) needs to plan
for the efficient demobilization of its contractors, while the Department of
State (State) needs to conduct acquisition planning for contract support
after the transition. At the same time, DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) continue to face contract and
management challenges, such as ensuring that a sufficient number of
trained personnel are available to oversee contractors and that vendors
and contractor personnel are vetted effectively.
Key Findings
DOD’s and State’s experiences in Iraq highlight important considerations
for contract management that require continued attention during the
drawdown and transition to a civilian-led presence in Afghanistan. During
the drawdown from Iraq, DOD faced challenges with demobilizing its
contractors, including determining contract requirements and identifying
risks associated with potential changes in contracting vehicles. We made
several recommendations in April 2010 to address related concerns,
which DOD took steps to address. Additionally, as occurred in Iraq, the
ratio of contractor to military personnel may increase substantially as the
drawdown progresses in Afghanistan, as contractors provide some
services previously provided by military personnel. This relative growth in
contractor personnel as the pool of military personnel available to perform
contract oversight functions decreases necessitates an increased focus on
oversight to help mitigate the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.
Furthermore, as we reported in August 2012, coordination between DOD
and State occurred late during the Iraq drawdown, contributing to delays
that made the transition and associated acquisitions of critical goods and
services more challenging. State found itself without sufficient personnel
with the expertise to conduct necessary acquisition activities to support its
mission in Iraq, and, as a result, relied on DOD for acquisition support.
However, the departments did not fully comply with requirements for the
use and management of such support, which continues to limit State’s
ability to conduct acquisition planning for the transition in Afghanistan.
Over the next year, as the U.S. transition in Afghanistan evolves, the
departments face a shrinking window of opportunity to determine whether
State’s continued reliance on DOD is appropriate or State should develop
its own capacity. Otherwise, State risks again relying on DOD’s support by
default rather than through sound business decisions.
DOD, State, and USAID face contract management and oversight
challenges in Afghanistan, and their oversight of U.S. contracts requires
additional improvement. For example, as we reported in September 2012,
Background
DOD, State, and USAID have
relied extensively on contractors to
support troops and civilian
personnel and conduct
reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan. For fiscal year 2012,
DOD obligated approximately
$17.6 billion on contracts
performed in Afghanistan, with
State and USAID reporting
obligations of $633 million and
$714 million, respectively.
Contract Management during
the Drawdown and Transition
Requires Continued Attention
Oversight of U.S. Contracts
Requires Additional Improvement
Enclosure VIII: Oversight of U.S. Contracts in
Afghanistan
Page 32 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
the three agencies continue to experience difficulty in reporting reliable
information on their contracts and contractor personnel in Afghanistan.
Such information is a starting point for ensuring proper management and
oversight. Furthermore, in March 2012, we reported that DOD oversight
personnel in Afghanistan did not always receive adequate training and
that DOD continued to lack a sufficient number of oversight personnel in
Afghanistan, which in some cases resulted in projects being completed
without sufficient oversight. In April 2010 we reported that, absent
strategic planning for their use of contractors, individual offices within
State and USAID often made
case-by-case decisions on using contractors
to support contract or grant administration, and risks, such as possible
conflicts of interest or insufficient oversight, were not always addressed.
We recommended that the agencies take actions such as developing new
training standards, conducting workforce planning, and issuing relevant
guidance. The agencies have taken steps to address some of these
recommendations and challenges. For example, DOD has developed a
new training course for contract oversight personnel with a focus on
contingency operations, while State has developed new guidance to
address conflict of interest and contract oversight risks. USAID has also
implemented an initiative in Afghanistan that includes several efforts to
improve contract award and oversight processes. However, additional
efforts will be necessary to help ensure sufficient contract oversight.
Our prior work also identified limitations among DOD’s, State’s, and
USAID’s procedures for ensuring that vendors and contractor personnel
are vetted effectively to help minimize risks to U.S. efforts and personnel.
We reported in June 2011 that DOD and USAID had developed vendor
vetting programs in part to address concerns that money from U.S.
contracts was being diverted to fund insurgent and criminal activities, but
State had not. At that time, we also reported on limitations in procedures
for vetting non-U.S. vendors and emphasized the need for better
information sharing among agencies about vendor vetting. We
recommended that DOD and USAID take steps to improve their vetting
processes by using a risk-based approach and that State assess the need
for and possible options to vet non-U.S. vendors. We also recommended
that the agencies consider procedures to improve information sharing.
DOD and USAID have since taken steps to improve their vetting
processes, and in June 2012, State announced that it would begin vetting
certain contractors in Afghanistan. A concept for an interagency vetting
working group to improve information sharing among Embassy sections
and agencies has also been developed. Going forward, continued
attention will be necessary to help ensure effective vetting processes and
procedures in Afghanistan and future contingency operations.
Oversight Questions
1. What steps is DOD taking to plan for its use and demobilization of
contractors during its drawdown from Afghanistan?
2. How are DOD and State coordinating for a transition of contracted
services when State assumes the lead U.S. role in Afghanistan after
the drawdown of U.S. forces?
3. To what extent do DOD, State, and USAID have adequate staff
resources, both in terms of numbers and expertise, in Afghanistan to
ensure the appropriate level of contract management and oversight?
4. How will DOD, State, and USAID institutionalize lessons learned about
contract management in Afghanistan to help ensure that they do not
face similar contract management challenges in future contingencies?
Contractor Vetting Procedures
Need Continued Attention
Point of Contact
Timothy DiNapoli, (202) 512-4841,
dinapolit@gao.gov
Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431,
russellc@gao.gov
Page 33 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
February 2013
Issue
Plans for the United States’ post-combat presence in Afghanistan,
currently scheduled to begin in January 2015, have been developed by
the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and are currently
being reviewed by U.S. National Security Staff. The United States is
transitioning from counterinsurgency and stability operations toward more
traditional diplomatic and development activities, according to U.S.
strategic documents. Current plans envision a diplomatic presence at the
U.S. embassy in Kabul and four consulates in other major cities. A
possible smaller but continuing military presence in Afghanistan is
expected to advise and assist Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
and continue counterterrorism efforts beyond 2014. Current plans call for
a further drawdown of both civilians and military personnel; however,
specific figures have not yet been determined.
Key Findings
While the circumstances, combat operations, and diplomatic efforts in Iraq
differ from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons can be learned from the
transition from a military to civilian-led presence in Iraq and applied to
Afghanistan to avoid possible missteps and better utilize resources. In
Iraq, State and DOD had to revise their plans for the U.S. presence from
more than 16,000 personnel at 14 sites down to 11,500 personnel at 11
sites after the transition had begun—in part because the United States did
not obtain the Government of Iraq’s commitment to the planned U.S.
presence. Given these reductions, we found that State was projected to
have an unobligated balance of between about $1.7 billion and about $2.3
billion in its Iraq operations budget at the end of fiscal year 2013.
According to DOD officials, U.S. Forces-Iraq planning assumed that a
follow-on U.S. military force would be approved by both governments. The
decision not to have a follow-on force led to a reassessment of DOD’s
plans and presence. Attacks on diplomatic facilities in countries such as
Libya should also be considered as the United States plans future facilities
in Afghanistan. U.S. agencies should take the necessary steps to ensure
that all facilities in Afghanistan meet security standards to the maximum
extent possible and that mitigating steps are taken to address
vulnerabilities. We previously recommended that such steps be taken in
Iraq; U.S. agencies concurred and have since begun vulnerability
assessments at Iraq sites.
State’s current plans for the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan call for
maintaining a significant presence of diplomats. In May 2012, the U.S. and
Afghan Presidents signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement that
committed both countries to strengthened long-term strategic cooperation.
Additionally, in July 2012, the U.S. President declared Afghanistan a
“major non-NATO ally,” 1 of 15 countries to receive such status, which
qualifies Afghanistan for certain privileges supporting defense and security
cooperation. These and other agreements, as well as U.S. planning
documents, demonstrate the intention of the United States to maintain
strong civilian and diplomatic ties with Afghanistan.
Background
In 2001, after the fall of the Taliban,
the United States established a
diplomatic and military presence in
Afghanistan. The total number of U.S.
civilians under the authority of the
U.S. embassy peaked at 1,253 in
January 2012. Civilian personnel
under DOD authority reached a high
of 3,022 in March 2011, coinciding
with the highest number of U.S. troops
at 99,800. The United States has
since begun to draw down its civilian
and military personnel in Afghanistan.
Transition from Military to
Civilian-Led Presence in Iraq
Could Offer Lessons for
Afghanistan
U.S. Civilian Presence in
Afghanistan Is Expected to
Remain Substantial
Enclosure IX: Planning for the Future U.S.
Presence in Afghanistan
Page 34 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figure 12: U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan
State’s enduring presence plan includes an embassy in Kabul (see fig. 12,
above left), and four other posts in, according to State officials, the key
strategic locations of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. The
U.S. embassy in Kabul is currently undergoing a major construction
project to expand the chancery and replace temporary offices and housing
with permanent structures. A new consulate facility in Herat opened in
March 2012. Although State determined that the initially selected site for a
consulate facility in Mazar-e-Sharif was found to be unsuitable, a new
location has not yet been decided upon. To date, State has committed
approximately $900 million to expand embassy facilities and establish new
consulate facilities in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. Additional costs to
establish consulate facilities in Jalalabad and Kandahar have not yet been
determined. According to officials, State is planning for over 700 civilians
to be posted in Afghanistan beyond 2014. All plans, according to State
officials, are subject to ongoing deliberations.
Although U.S. and Afghan officials have stated that a continued military
partnership between the two countries is desired beyond 2014, the details
of that partnership have not yet been determined. Sensitive issues on the
status and precise nature of an ongoing U.S. military presence remain to
be negotiated between the United States and Afghanistan. U.S. and
Afghan authorities began negotiations on a bilateral security agreement in
November 2012 to establish a framework for the U.S. military’s post-2014
presence. As agreed in the May 2012 Strategic Partnership Agreement,
the goal is to complete the negotiations of the bilateral security agreement
within one year, by November 2013. This agreement is expected to
supersede the current status of forces agreement upon entry into force.
According to DOD officials, issues regarding the future roles and
responsibilities of any U.S. forces that remain in Afghanistan after 2014,
such as immunity for foreign military forces under Afghan law, are likely to
present a challenge as negotiations progress.
Oversight Questions
1. In light of the lessons learned from the Iraq transition, to what extent
has State taken steps to plan for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan?
2. What steps are State and DOD taking to ensure that all post-2014
facilities meet security guidelines and that site vulnerabilities are
addressed?
3. What steps has the United States taken to plan for the multiple
possible outcomes of the bilateral security agreement negotiations?
State Plans for Five Diplomatic
Sites in Afghanistan Post-2014
Future U.S. Military Presence
in Afghanistan Is Uncertain
Point of Contact
For more information, contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
(202) 512-7331,
johnsoncm@gao.gov
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619,
pickups@gao.gov
Appendix I: Key Facts about Afghanistan
Page 35 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figure 13: Key Facts about Afghanistan
INSTRUCTIONS for interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return
to Figure 1.
a
Afghanistan’s National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/2008: A Profile of Afghanistan
identified a smaller labor force of over 12 million.
b
Afghanistan’s National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/2008: A Profile of Afghanistan found
a lower literacy rate of 26 percent of the total adult population (39 percent for males and 12 percent of
females).
Appendix I: Key Facts about Afghanistan
Appendix II: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan
Page 36 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figure 14: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan
INSTRUCTIONS for interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return
to Figure 1.
Appendix II: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan
Appendix III: Major U.S. Transit Points into and
out of Afghanistan
Page 37 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Figure 15: Major U.S. Transit Points into and out of Afghanistan
INSTRUCTIONS for interactive graphic: Click your mouse here to return
to Figure 1.
Appendix III: Major U.S. Transit Points into
and out of Afghanistan
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the
Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan
Page 38 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
This appendix provides information regarding documents shown in figure
3 (see table 3). This information can also be accessed via the interactive
rollovers in the electronic version of the figure.
Table 3: Descriptions of the Afghan, U.S., and NATO Documents that Constitute the Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan
Documents Date issued Description
Afghan documents and international agreements
Bonn Agreement December 2001
The Bonn Agreement, signed in December 2001 under the sponsorship of
the United Nations (UN),
was the first of several international agreements that
laid out a framework for the transition of Afghanistan from Taliban rule to a
new Afghan national government. The agreement established an interim
authority for Afghanistan, requested the UN to authorize an international
security force to assist in the transition, and set out the role of the UN to
advise the interim authority.
Afghan Compact January 2006 The Afghan Compact (January 2006) was the product of the 2006 London
Conference—a meeting of Afghanistan’s government, over 50 other nations,
and the UN and other international organizations. The compact first
introduced the concept of security, governance, and development as the
areas of focus for Afghan reconstruction activities. In the compact,
the Afghan
government, with the support of the international community, committed to
achieving benchmarks in these areas, such as developing a professional
national army by the end of 2010.
Afghan National
Development Strategy
2008 The Afghan National Development Strategy (2008) is Afghanistan’s guiding
document for achieving its reconstruction goals. The strategy focuses on
improving the country’s security, governance, and economic growth and
reducing poverty. It also provides information on the resources needed to
carry out the strategy and on the shortfall in Afghanistan’s projected revenue.
It was released in 2008 and is effective through 2013.
London Conference
Communiqué
January 2010 The London Conference Communiqué, issued in January 2010, was the
product of the 2010 London Conference. Conference participants committed
to helping the government of Afghanistan in several areas, such as
anticorruption and improving the capability of the Afghan army and police
forces. Conference participants also acknowledged the intention of NATO’s
North Atlantic Council to begin transitioning the lead responsibility for
security—province by province—from NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force to Afghan forces in late 2010/early 2011.
Kabul Process July 2010 The Kabul Process, established as a result of the July 2010 Kabul
Conference, created an internationally agreed-upon “path to an economically
sustainable, socially vibrant and stable Afghanistan, led by Afghans for
Afghans, [and] supported by the international community.” The Process is
defined by the National Priority Programs, which were introduced at the
conference and address a wide range of issues raised in the Afghan National
Development Strategy and serve as a prioritization and implementation plan
for the strategy.
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the
Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the
Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan
Page 39 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Documents Date issued Description
Bonn Conference
Conclusions
December 2011 The Bonn Conference Conclusions, issued at the December 2011 Bonn
Conference, began the discussion of Afghanistan’s future during 2015-
2024—which was termed the “Transformation Decade” at the conference—
following international declarations that international military forces would
complete their drawdown in Afghanistan by December 2014.
Chicago Summit
Declaration
May 2012 The Chicago Summit Declaration, issued at the May 2012 Chicago Summit,
drew together the 28 NATO countries and Afghanistan to discuss the
sustainability of Afghan National Security Forces beyond the drawdown of
international military forces in 2014. Nations affirmed their commitment with
pledges of financial support.
Enduring Strategic
Partnership Agreement
May 2012 The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was signed on May 2, 2012.
The agreement details several areas in which both parties agree to support
one another, including protecting and promoting shared democratic values,
advancing long-term security, reinforcing regional security and cooperation,
supporting social and economic development, and strengthening Afghan
institutions and governance. As part of this agreement, the United States
pledged to designate Afghanistan a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), and did
so on July 6, 2012; MNNA status qualifies a country for certain privileges
supporting defense and security cooperation, but does not entail any security
commitments to that country.
Tokyo Conference
Declaration and Framework
July 2012 The Tokyo Conference Declaration and Framework, issued at the July 2012
Tokyo Conference, resulted in a declaration of continued support toward
Afghanistan’s long-term economic growth and fiscal self-reliance, called upon
greater Afghan effort to combat corruption, and elicited pledges of financial
support for Afghanistan as it heads into the “Transformation Decade.” It also
introduced the Mutual Accountability Framework that holds Afghanistan and
the international community accountable for achieving and supporting good
governance goals and indicators across five areas.
U.S. plans and strategies
Operation Enduring
Freedom Campaign Plan
November 2001
continuing
The Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan (2001) and updates are
classified. Operation Enduring Freedom is the ongoing U.S.-led operation
that coordinates with ISAF to conduct counterterrorism operations in
Afghanistan and elsewhere. It operates under a U.S. commander who is also
the commanding general of ISAF.
Status of Forces
Agreement
May 2003 The Status of Forces Agreement was established through the exchange of
diplomatic notes on September 26, December 12, 2002, and May 28, 2003,
and entered into force on May 28, 2003. The agreement lays out the status of
DOD military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan in connection with
cooperative efforts in response to terrorism; humanitarian and civic
assistance; military training and exercises; and other activities. These
personnel are accorded a status equivalent to administrative and technical
staff of the U.S. embassy under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961, making them immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan
authorities, among other protections.
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the
Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan
Page 40 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Documents Date issued Description
Afghanistan and Pakistan
Regional Stabilization
Strategy
November 2011 The Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, signed by the
Secretaries of Defense and State, was released in January 2010 and,
according to State officials, most recently updated in November 2011 through
the Status Report: Afghanistan and Pakistan Civilian Engagement. The report
focuses on U.S. non-military efforts and states that the U.S. combat mission
is not open-
ended but that the United States is committed to building a lasting
partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan. With regard to Afghanistan, the
strategy focuses on supporting an Afghan-led, sustainable transition; building
an economic foundation for Afghanistan’s future; supporting Afghanistan’s
governance and political institutions; strengthening Afghan rule of law;
sustainable development investments; advancing the rights of Afghan women
and girls; and oversight of Afghanistan assistance. Under each of these
areas, the strategy identifies key issues and achievements. According to
State officials, it supersedes the March 2009 U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
Afghanistan Pakistan
Objectives 2015
August 2012 Afghanistan Pakistan Objectives 2015, signed in August 2012, replaced the
National Security Council Strategic Implementation Plan signed in July 2009
and is classified. According to State officials, the plan provides a series of
goals and objectives for implementing the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional
Stabilization Strategy. The plan also includes measures of effectiveness to
track progress in achieving the objectives.
Civil-Military Strategic
Framework for Afghanistan
October 2012 The Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan was originally signed
in August 2009 (and named the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan)
by the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and the commanding general, U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan. It was updated in February 2011, March 2012, and
October 2012 and renamed the Civil-Military Strategic Framework. The
current framework is less detailed than the original to be more adaptable and
allow flexibility, according to officials. The framework is designed to articulate
the strategic vision guiding U.S. government efforts to achieve U.S. national
goals in Afghanistan and to ensure that U.S. civilian and military efforts in
Afghanistan are fully integrated and complementary. The plan addresses four
categories of effort, including security, governance, rule of law, and
socioeconomic development, as well as the crosscutting issues of
reconciliation and reintegration, the role of women in society, borders,
information initiatives, and regional cooperation.
Enduring Presence Plans
Post 2014
2012 According to State officials, the Enduring Presence Plans Post 2014 are
classified planning documents submitted by State, DOD, and the Intelligence
Community to the National Security Staff. Together they lay out initial plans
for the post-2014 U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
NATO plans and documents
Supreme Headquarters of
the Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) Operational Plan
June 2003
August 2012
The SHAPE OPLAN (June 2003) is a classified document. According to a
NATO official, this plan was issued in 2003 to direct NATO operations inside
Kabul. SHAPE, a component of NATO, was established in 1951 as part of an
effort to establish an integrated and effective NATO military force. SHAPE’s
mission is to prepare, plan, and conduct military operations in order to meet
NATO political objectives.
The SHAPE OPLAN (August 2012) is a classified document. According to a
NATO official, this plan provided for NATO to assume responsibility
throughout Afghanistan—all regions plus established Regional Command
Capital (Kabul). This document was revised three times since its initial
release in April 2006.
Appendix IV: Documents that Constitute the
Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in
Afghanistan
Page 41 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Documents Date issued Description
International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)
Operational Plan
March 2006 continuing The ISAF OPLAN (March 2006) is classified. The current revision was
released in October 2011. ISAF is a NATO-led mission in Afghanistan
established by the UN Security Council in December 2001. ISAF is
composed of troops contributed by the United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and other nations, including member nations of the European Union
and NATO. ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability
and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the
Afghan National Security Forces, and facilitate improvements in governance
and socioeconomic development.
NATO Strategic Plan for
Afghanistan
May 2012 The NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan (May 2012) is classified. According
to DOD, it confirms NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan through 2024 and
defines objectives for ISAF through the completion of
security transition at the
end of 2014. It also includes a mid-2013 interim milestone for the Coalition
and Afghanistan marking the beginning of the ANSF assumption of the lead
for combat operations across the country and a shift in NATO’s primary
mission
from combat to training, advising, and assisting in order to ensure the
ANSF have required support while adjusting to their increased
responsibilities. It replaced the April 2008 Comprehensive Strategic Political
Military Plan.
North Atlantic Council
Initiating Directive
October 2012 The North Atlantic Council Initiating Directive (October 2012) is classified.
According to DOD, the North Atlantic Council acknowledges commitments
made at the Chicago summit and issued the North Atlantic Council Initiating
Directive to start formal operations planning for the post-2014 NATO-led
international training, advisory, and assistance mission in Afghanistan.
Sources: Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Mission to NATO, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Agency for International Development, UN, and government of Afghanistan documents.
Appendix V: U.S. Civil-Military Strategic
Framework for Afghanistan
Page 42 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
This appendix provides information regarding the U.S. Civil-Military
Strategic Framework for Afghanistan in figure 3. This information can also
be accessed via the interactive rollovers in the electronic version of the
figure.
The U.S. strategic goal for Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al Qaeda and prevent its return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Specific
objectives in Afghanistan in support of this goal are to (1) deny safe
haven to al Qaeda and (2) deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the
Afghan government.
1
Each pillar below contains key priorities.
• Security foundation
• Security is the foundation of the Framework, creating an
environment that allows progress on the three key pillars. The
counterinsurgency campaign will degrade the insurgency to a
level that denies it the ability to threaten the Afghan state and
enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume full
responsibility for security by the end of 2014.
1. Support the development of an increasingly capable ANSF that
can partner with the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) to neutralize the insurgency.
2. Execute the counterinsurgency campaign.
• Governance pillar
• Working with the United Nations Assistance Mission to
Afghanistan and allied partners, the United States will continue to
support Afghan efforts to strengthen governance by facilitating
efforts to ensure that government and its institutions are
representative, accountable, responsive, constitutionally
legitimate, and capable of performing key functions.
1
The U.S. strategic goals for Afghanistan were recently changed from those that appeared
in the October 2012 U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. The goals as
they appeared in October 2012 were to (1) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its
affiliates and prevent their return to Afghanistan; and (2) build a partnership with the
Afghan people that ensures that the United States will be able to continue to target
terrorists and support a sovereign Afghan government.
Appendix V: U.S. Civil-Military Strategic
Framework for Afghanistan
Strategic Goal
Pillars and Key Priorities
Appendix V: U.S. Civil-Military Strategic
Framework for Afghanistan
Page 43 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
1. Support constitutional succession through credible and inclusive
presidential elections.
2. Strengthen checks and balances and independent institutions.
3. Strengthen revenue collection and budget prioritization, execution,
and accountability at both the national and subnational levels.
4. Stem corruption through support for open and accountable
government.
• Rule of law pillar
• The United States will support Afghan efforts to offer meaningful
access to fair, efficient, and transparent justice based on Afghan
law. The United States also will support Afghan efforts to increase
the government of Afghanistan’s legitimacy among Afghans by
promoting a culture that values the rule of law. U.S. government
rule-of-law entities will continue to pursue a wide range of
activities focusing on the fight against corruption in Afghanistan.
The U.S. government also will support the government of
Afghanistan’s efforts to transition the Afghan National Police to a
rule-of-law based institution. Collectively, these efforts are
expected to form the foundation for a functioning civil society.
1. Increase access to justice by developing institutional capacity,
providing legal education, and strengthening capacity to combat
corruption.
2. Partner with the government of Afghanistan to increase its
capacity to manage a safe, secure, and humane correctional
system that discourages the radicalization of prisoners.
3. Provide support for traditional justice systems.
4. Develop law enforcement leadership and capacity.
• Socioeconomic development pillar
• The United States will support sustainable, inclusive economic
growth that will help Afghanistan to be increasingly integrated
economically within the region. The United States will also
facilitate access between Afghanistan and the international
economy to strengthen governmental and private sector
development.
1. Support private sector investment, job creation, and food security.
2. Improve Afghanistan’s economic integration into the region
through the New Silk Road Initiative, which will improve
Appendix V: U.S. Civil-Military Strategic
Framework for Afghanistan
Page 44 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s ability to access foreign markets and supply its
domestic market.
3. Strengthen the capacity of the government of Afghanistan to act
as an important enabler of sustainable private sector participation
in the economy, regulatory reform, public revenue generation, and
improved flow of resources from Kabul to the provinces.
4. Strengthen the capacity of the government of Afghanistan at
central and subnational levels to operate and maintain
infrastructure and key services, and support critical gains in
education and health.
• Reconciliation and reintegration: The United States will continue to
support Afghan efforts to achieve a broad-based political
reconciliation that includes leadership elements of the insurgency.
• Role of women in society: The United States will continue to prioritize
gender issues to ensure the positive gains of the last 11 years are
irreversible and Afghanistan achieves continued progress on the
protection and promotion of women’s rights.
• Borders: The United States will support government of Afghanistan
efforts to improve its border management practices, apply consistently
the rule of law, and increase efforts to interdict cross border
movement of terrorist, insurgent, and criminal networks, addressing
these networks’ associated financial activity.
• Information initiatives: The United States will pursue the use of
strategic communications and access to information for Afghan
citizens that support credible and inclusive presidential elections,
promote the government of Afghanistan’s legitimacy, counter
extremist voices, and facilitate transition.
• Regional cooperation: The United States is committed to supporting
all confidence-building measures outlined in the Kabul Conference,
offering support and assistance in a way that makes sense for the
region, and is welcomed by the region’s countries. For example, the
Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure
and Stable Afghanistan between Afghanistan and neighboring
countries represents an opportunity for the region’s countries to
develop more cooperative arrangements on security, trade,
infrastructure, and natural disasters.
Crosscutting Issues
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Page 45 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
This appendix provides a list of recent products related to each enclosure.
Report numbers with an SU or RSU suffix are Sensitive but Unclassified
and those with a C suffix are classified.
Sensitive but Unclassified and Classified reports are available to
personnel with the proper clearances and need-to-know upon request.
For a copy of a Sensitive but Unclassified or Classified report, please
contact the point of contact listed in the related enclosure.
The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan. GAO-10-655R.
Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2010.
Afghanistan Security: Multiple Campaign and Operational Plans Direct
U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan. GAO-10-619C. Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2010.
Overseas Contingency Operations: Reported Obligations for the
Department of Defense. GAO-09-1022R. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2009.
Overseas Contingency Operations: Reported Obligations for the
Department of Defense. GAO-09-791R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2009.
Afghanistan: U.S.- and Internationally-Funded Roads (GAO-09-626SP),
an E-supplement to GAO-09-473SP. GAO-09-626SP. Washington, D.C.:
April 21, 2009.
Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-473SP.
Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2009.
Defense Biometrics: Additional Training for Leaders and More Timely
Transmission of Data Could Enhance the Use of Biometrics in
Afghanistan. GAO-12-442. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2012.
Afghan Security: Renewed Sharing of Biometric Data Could Strengthen
U.S. Efforts to Protect U.S. Personnel from Afghan Security Force
Attacks. GAO-12-471SU. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on
Terrorist Safe Havens. GAO-11-561. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2011.
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Letter
Enclosure I: Afghanistan’s
Security Environment
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Page 46 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Drug Control: International Programs Face Significant Challenges
Reducing the Supply of Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign
Policy Objectives. GAO-10-921T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.
Afghanistan’s Security Environment. GAO-10-613R. Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 2010.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but
Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts
Needed. GAO-10-291. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2010.
Afghanistan’s Security Environment. GAO-10-178R. Washington, D.C.:
November 5, 2009.
Afghanistan Security: Security Transition. GAO-12-598C. Washington,
D.C.: September 11, 2012.
Observations on U.S. Military Capabilities to Support Transition of Lead
Security Responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces.
GAO-12-734C. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and
Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T.
Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.
Interim Results on U.S.-NATO Efforts to Transition Lead Security
Responsibility to Afghan Forces. GAO-12-607C. Washington, D.C.:
May 18, 2012.
Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide
Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556.
Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Needed to
Improve DOD Guidance, Integration of Tools, and Training for Collection
Management. GAO-12-396C. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan
Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps.
GAO-12-293R. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2012.
Enclosure II: Transition of
Lead Security to Afghan
Security Forces
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Page 47 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Language and Culture Training: Opportunities Exist to Improve Visibility
and Sustainment of Knowledge and Skills in Army and Marine Corps
General Purpose Forces. GAO-12-50. Washington, D.C.: October 31,
2011.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army
Brigades to Support the Advising Mission. GAO-11-760. Washington,
D.C.: August 2, 2011.
DOD Has Increased Its Use of Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Capabilities in Afghanistan but Would Benefit from
Improved Planning for Using Its Capabilities and Utilization of Lessons
Learned. GAO-11-224C. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2011.
Afghanistan Security: Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress and
Sustainment of Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-12-951T.
Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Estimated Costs to Support Afghan National
Security Forces Underscore Concerns about Sustainability.
GAO-12-438SU. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2012.
Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers
Needed; Long-Term Costs Not Determined. GAO-11-66. Washington,
D.C.: January 27, 2011.
Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DOD Decision Makers Need
Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess
Equipment. GAO-13-185R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2012.
Defense Management: Steps Taken to Better Manage Fuel Demand but
Additional Information Sharing Mechanisms Are Needed. GAO-12-619.
Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012.
Warfighter Support: DOD Has Made Progress, but Supply and
Distribution Challenges Remain in Afghanistan. GAO-12-138.
Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2011.
Defense Logistics: DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Address
Challenges in Supply Chain Management. GAO-11-569. Washington,
D.C.: July 28, 2011.
Enclosure III: Future Cost
and Sustainability of
Afghan Security Forces
Enclosure IV: DOD
Planning for the
Drawdown of Equipment
in Afghanistan
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Page 48 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility,
Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role.
GAO-11-774. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2011.
Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress and
Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan.
GAO-10-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2010.
Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Progress and
Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan.
GAO-10-462C. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2010.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient
Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq. GAO-10-376.
Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2010.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD Planning for
the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq. GAO-10-179. Washington, D.C.:
November 2, 2009.
Afghanistan’s Donor Dependence. GAO-11-948R. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2011.
Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S.
Assistance to Afghanistan Government. GAO-11-710. Washington, D.C.:
July 20, 2011.
Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs.
GAO-12-802T. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2012.
Afghanistan Governance: Performance-Data Gaps Hinder Overall
Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity.
GAO-11-907. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2011.
Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S.
Assistance to Afghanistan Government. GAO-11-710. Washington, D.C.:
July 20, 2011.
Enclosure V: Afghanistan’s
Donor Dependence
Enclosure VI: Oversight
and Accountability of U.S.
Funds to Support
Afghanistan
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Page 49 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Afghanistan Development: Agencies Could Benefit from a Shared and
More Comprehensive Database on U.S. Efforts. GAO-13-34. Washington,
D.C.: November 7, 2012.
Afghanistan: USAID Oversight of Assistance Funds and Programs.
GAO-12-802T. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2012.
Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information
Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration. GAO-12-534.
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012.
DOD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations: Actions Needed
to Establish Project Management Guidelines and Enhance Information
Sharing. GAO-11-715. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011.
Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector
Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination.
GAO-11-138. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2010.
Afghanistan Development: USAID Continues to Face Challenges in
Managing and Overseeing U.S. Development Assistance Programs.
GAO-10-932T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2010.
Afghanistan Development: Poverty and Major Crop Production
(GAO-10-756SP), an E-Supplement to GAO-10-368. GAO-10-756SP.
Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010.
Afghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance Management
and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID’s Agricultural Programs.
GAO-10-368. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010.
Afghanistan and Pakistan: Oversight of U.S. Interagency Efforts.
GAO-09-1015T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and
Interagency Coordination for the Commander’s Emergency Response
Program in Afghanistan. GAO-09-615. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.
Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to
Better Prepare for Future Contingencies. GAO-12-1026T. Washington,
D.C.: September 12, 2012.
Enclosure VII: Oversight
and Streamlining of
Development Assistance to
Afghanistan
Enclosure VIII: Oversight
of U.S. Contracts in
Afghanistan
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Page 50 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on
Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting. GAO-12-977R.
Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.
Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency
Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law.
GAO-12-750. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2012.
Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations
by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
GAO-12-854R. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 2012.
Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements
Needed in Afghanistan. GAO-12-290. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012.
Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility,
Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role.
GAO-11-774. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2011.
Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for
Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel.
GAO-11-886. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2011.
Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Address Contract
Oversight and Vetting of Non-U.S. Vendors in Afghanistan.
GAO-11-771T. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011.
Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors Need Improvement.
GAO-11-355. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2011.
Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address
Systemic Challenges. GAO-11-580. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2011.
Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued
Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and
Associated Personnel. GAO-11-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2010.
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient
Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq. GAO-10-376.
Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2010.
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Page 51 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of
Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq and
Afghanistan. GAO-10-357. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2010.
Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using
Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. GAO-10-472.
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Face Challenges in Tracking Contracts,
Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Associated Personnel.
GAO-10-509T. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2010.
Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and
Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations.
GAO-10-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2010.
Contingency Contracting: Further Improvements Needed in Agency
Tracking of Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
GAO-10-187. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2009.
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face
Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. GAO-10-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009.
Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and Finalize
Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security
Contractors. GAO-09-351. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DOD Should Ensure Interagency
Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law.
GAO-12-750. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2012.
Mission Iraq: State and DOD Have Not Finalized Security and Support
Capabilities. GAO-12-759RSU. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012.
Mission Iraq: State and DOD Face Challenges in Finalizing Support and
Security Capabilities. GAO-12-856T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2012.
“Status of Transition to State-Led U.S. Security Assistance to Iraq.”
Sensitive but Unclassified Briefing for Job Code 320893, Washington,
D.C.: April 2012.
Enclosure IX: Planning for
the Future U.S. Presence
in Afghanistan
Appendix VI: Related GAO Products
Page 52 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S.
Civilian Presence. GAO-12-285. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2012.
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Page 53 GAO-13-218SP Afghanistan
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov
In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant
Director), Thomas Costa, Julia Jebo Grant, Christopher J. Mulkins,
Debbie Chung, Gergana Danailova-Trainor, Etana Finkler, David W.
Hancock, Brandon L. Hunt, Guy LoFaro, Anne McDonough-Hughes,
Sharon Pickup, Jeremy Sebest, Stephen K. Woods, and Amanda G.
Weldon made key contributions to this product.
Godwin M. Agbara, Ashley G. Alley, Pedro Almoguera, Johana R. Ayers,
Carole F. Coffey, Teakoe Coleman, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Martin de
Alteriis, Timothy J. DiNapoli, Mark Dowling, Emily Gupta, Kasea Hamar,
Patrick Hickey, Jordan Holt, Farahnaaz Khakoo-Mausel, Joseph
Kirschbaum, Bruce Kutnick, Drew Lindsey, Judith A. McCloskey, Tet
Miyabara, Mary E. Moutsos, Marcus Lloyd Oliver, Nina Pfeiffer, Elizabeth
Repko, Kendal B. Robinson, Luis E. Rodriguez, Cary B. Russell, Mona
Sehgal, Esther Toledo, Pierre Toureille, and Sally Williamson provided
technical assistance and additional support.
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff
Acknowledgments
(320924)
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